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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
process under appropriate statutory provisions, such as Sections
253 and 254 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
2 0
In Ellis v. Riley, 2  a case decided recently, but governed by
the CPA, the supreme court, Kings County, ruled that if the
driver of an automobile owned by a non-resident gives the non-
resident owner's address incorrectly, and the plaintiff is not able
to discover the non-resident's correct address, then the defendant
is not amenable to process within the meaning of Section 253
of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Hence, CPA § 19(1) was inap-
plicable and, during the period of time it took the plaintiff to dis-
cover the non-resident's address, the statute of limitations was
tolled.
Although. the CPLR was inapplicable to Ellis, the decision
hints that the rule would be the same under CPLR 207(3) ,22 as-
suming, of course, due diligence on the part of the plaintiff.
CPLR 210(b): Held to be a tolling provision.
CPLR 210(b) provides that the "period of eighteen months
after the death . . . of a person against whom a cause of action
exists is not a part of the time within which the action must be
commenced against his executor or administrator." This provision
is "substantially unchanged" 23 from its predecessors, CPA §§ 12
and 21, which were uniformly held to mean that the death of the
potential defendant immediately tolled the statute of limitations for
eighteen months.
24
Regardless of the legislative and decisional history surround-
ing this section, the supreme court, Bronx County, in Schwartz v.
2oHarvey v. Fussell, 13 Misc. 2d 602, 177 N.Y.S.2d 234 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County), aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 742, 181 N.Y.S2d 198 (2d Dep't 1958).
Section 253(1) provides that when a non-resident's motor vehicle is involved
in an automobile accident in New York, jurisdiction may be had over him
by service of process on the Secretary of State. Section 253(2) provides
that such service is sufficient if notice of service, a copy of the summons
and a copy of the complaint are sent by or for the plaintiff to the defendant
by registered mail with return receipt requested. Section 254 makes the
provisions of section 253 applicable to service on a resident absent from
the state for more than thirty days. It has been ruled that the giving
of an incorrect address at the time of the accident estops the defendant
from claiming as an affirmative defense plaintiff's non-compliance with
section 253.
2153 Misc. 2d 615, 279 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Sup. Ct Kings County 1967).
22 CPLR 207(3), similar to CPA § 19, makes the tolling provision of
207 inapplicable where "jurisdiction over the person of the defendant can
be obtained without personal delivery of the summons to him within the
state."
23 ]FDH RsEp. 46.
24For a succinct analysis of the history of CPA §§ 12 and 21, see
The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
279, 285-87 (1966).
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Public Administrator,25 read CPLR 210(b) as granting the injured
party an extension of eighteen months after the potential defendant's
death to initiate an action in the event that the statute of limitations
expired during that period.26  The appellate division, first depart-
ment, reversed, and held that CPLR 210(b), as did its predecessors,
tolls the statute of limitations for an eighteen-month period in the
event of the potential defendant's death.2 7
CPLR 214(7): Period of limitation is a condition precedent.
CPLR 214(7) states that an action to annul a marriage on
the ground of fraud must be commenced within three years of the
discovery of the fraud s.2  As with all periods of limitation, it
must be determined whether this statutory period constitutes a
statute of limitations or a condition precedent. If it is a statute of
limitations, it is only a limitation on the cause of action and must
be asserted as a defense. But, if it is a condition precedent, it is an
ingredient of the cause of action which the plaintiff must establish as
part of his case. If he cannot establish that the suit was
brought within the three-year period, the cause of action is
extinguished completely. A general test to ascertain the nature
of the period is to look to the common law. If the cause of
action was known at common law, the limiting period is merely a
statute of limitations. But, if a statute created the cause of action
and attached a limitation of time to the commencement of the action,
then the limitation period is a condition precedent.2 9
Although it seems that at common law there was no right to
annul a marriage on the ground of fraud, and, consequently, any
period of limitation would be a condition precedent,30 in the 1910 de-
cision of McNair v. McNair 3 1 it was ruled that this period was a
defense, which, if not raised, was waived. This position was
affirmed in 1959 in the case of Rogers v. Rogers.32
25 50 Misc. 2d 200, 266 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct Bronx County 1966).
26E.g., if the defendant died with one year left for the plaintiff to sue,
under prior law the plaintiff would have one year and eighteen months
from the date of the defendant's death in which to commence his action.
However, under the interpretation given CPLR 210(b) by the supreme
court in Schwartz, the plaintiff would only have a total of eighteen months
from the defendant's death in which to sue.27 Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 27 App. Div. 2d 913, 278 N.Y.S.2d 968
(1st Dep't 1967) (memorandum decision).
28The section is based upon CPA § 49(9), and no change was intended
from the CPA. SECOND REP. 69; FnFrT REP. 55. Section 1750 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provided that an action to annul a marriage for fraud
could be initiated "at any time." This language was kept until the CPA
was amended in 1955. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 257.
2D See McLaughlin, Annual Survey, New York Practice, 15 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 381, 393 (1963).
3OSee Montgomery v. Montgomery, 3 Barb. 132 (N.Y. Ch. 1848).31 140 App. Div. 226, 125 N.Y.S. 1 (2d Dep't 1910).
3219 Misc. Zd 487, 187 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
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